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Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those 
weapons have not.  In a strange turn of history, the threat of 
global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear 
attack has gone up.1 
— President Barack Obama, April 5, 2009 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
My topic is counter-proliferation in the context of maritime interdiction.  
In particular, I’d like to address the recent UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1929,2 which is generally viewed as having increased the pressure 
on Iran to stop its nuclear program.  With a focus on the maritime 
perspective, we will look at whether UNSCR 1929 has, in fact, succeeded in 
increasing the pressure on Iran to steer its nuclear program toward 
compliance with international norms. 
The current Administration is extremely serious about its counter-
proliferation efforts.  In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama 
emphasized “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a 
world without nuclear weapons.”3  But, in that same speech, he spoke of the 
reality that, despite the end of the Cold War and its associated arms race, 
“the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up.”4  
The counter-proliferation field includes a number of dimensions.  Legal 
regimes exist to (1) stop the development of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), through treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty;5 (2) cease the 
testing of WMD, through the Limited Test Ban Treaty6 and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;7 (3) reduce the stockpiles of WMD, 
through the New START Treaty;8 (4) secure existing stockpiles, through the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Prague Address on Nuclear Weapons (Apr. 5, 2009) 
[hereinafter Prague Address] (video available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/The-
President-in-Prague#transcript; for the transcript, follow “Read the Transcript” hyperlink on 
the same page). 
 2 S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010). 
 3 Prague Address, supra note 1. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty]. 
 6 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. 
 7 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 105-28, 35 I.L.M. 1439. 
 8 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
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Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;9 (5) eliminate 
stockpiles of chemical weapons, through the Chemical Weapons 
Convention;10 (6) cease the manufacture and facilitate the destruction of 
biological and toxin weapons, through the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention;11 and (7) destroy existing surplus materials, through bilateral 
efforts, such as the multi-year, multi-billion dollar Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) Program dating back to the early 1990s, and funded 
consistently by the U.S. Congress.12   
I would also like to point out that, during his time of distinctive service in 
the Department of Defense, my friend and colleague on this panel, Professor 
Jack Beard, was responsible for initiating groundbreaking international 
agreements that provided the foundation for some of the earliest and most 
essential CTR assistance efforts in Russia and other former Soviet Republics, 
thereby bringing the Nunn-Lugar program to life.13  Lastly, the UN Security 
Council has declared that WMD proliferation is a threat to international 
peace and security and, through its adoption of UNSCR 1540,14 has required 
member states to adopt domestic legislation and import/export regulations to 
prevent WMD from getting into the wrong hands.  Since the adoption of 
UNSCR 1540, the Security Council has expanded the international effort to 
                                                                                                                   
Arms, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 111-5.  The New START Treaty has 
been passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  See Key Senate Committee Passes 
Nuclear Arms Treaty, CNN (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/09/16/se 
nate.start.treaty/.   
 9 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, entered into force Feb. 8, 
1997, T.I.A.S. 11080 (codified in the U.S. as Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-351, 96 Stat. 1663 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)). 
 10 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, entered into force Apr. 29, 1997, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention]. 
 11 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, entered into force 
Mar. 26, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Biological Weapons 
Convention]. 
 12 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-228, 105 Stat. 1691 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2551).  In its first year, the Nunn-Lugar Act authorized the use of four 
hundred million dollars to assist the Soviet Union and its “successor entities” with efforts “to 
(1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and other weapons, (2) transport, store, 
disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) establish 
verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”  Id. § 212(b). 
 13 See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and 
Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation, with Implementing 
Agreements, U.S.-Russ., June 17, 1992, Temp. State Dep’t No. 05-168. 
 14 S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
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thwart WMD development by adopting far-reaching measures targeted at 
particular states that pose a high risk for proliferation.  It is this new effort to 
focus attention on individual states that has brought us where we are today. 
I would like to focus on a particularly vexing manifestation of the WMD 
problem—WMD “on the move”—and high seas interdiction as a response to 
that threat.  Although the Department of Defense has a role—and certainly a 
major interest—in all aspects of the non-proliferation problem, given the 
need for military forces to intercept WMD shipments in transit through the 
global commons, WMD “on the move” is an area of concern that the 
Department of Defense is particularly competent to address.  Stated another 
way, the Department’s role in addressing the reality to which President 
Obama referred in his April 2009 speech—that the WMD risk is increasing, 
not decreasing15—is indeed a prominent one. 
The task of halting the flow of proliferation material and technology, and 
keeping them out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations, is daunting, to 
say the least.  Approximately ninety percent of international cargo moves by 
sea,16 and vast spans of the world’s oceans remain unmonitored.  Moreover, 
it is believed that no more than ten percent of shipped cargoes are opened 
and inspected when in port.17  In early 2004 the world learned that Dr. A.Q. 
Khan—the chief architect of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program—and his 
global network had been selling nuclear weapons technology and equipment 
to North Korea, Libya, and Iran on the black market for more than fifteen 
years, using components obtained in Europe, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Malaysia.18  Although we eventually became aware of these activities, there 
may be many others that will never be discovered. 
Non-proliferation and counter-proliferation strategies must account for 
the fact that arms producers and sellers—both state and private actors—are 
players in a competitive and wildly lucrative global market, in which the 
unscrupulous player stands to reap a fortune.   
Efforts to stop proliferation through high seas interdiction, however, are 
not a hopeless endeavor.  With good intelligence and careful legal thinking, 
maritime interdiction can yield results, as seen in 2003 in the case of the 
                                                                                                                   
 15 Prague Address, supra note 1. 
 16 Michael Lyon Baker, Toward an African Maritime Economy: Empowering the African 
Union to Revolutionize the African Maritime Sector, 64 NAVAL WAR C. REV., no. 2, 2011 at 
39, 41. 
 17 This figure specifically refers to U.S. port inspections.  See ISSUES IN TERRORISM AND 
HOMELAND SECURITY: SELECTIONS FROM CQ RESEARCHER 317 (Jerry Westby et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 2011). 
 18 David Rohde & David E. Sanger, Key Pakistani Is Said to Admit Atom Transfers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at A1. 
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cargo ship, M/V (motor vessel) BBC China.  Intelligence services (including 
those of the United States and the United Kingdom) correctly believed that 
the BBC China was transferring centrifuges for nuclear weapons production 
to Libya in October 2003.19  Although an actual boarding at sea was not 
required because the German government was able to convince the German 
shipowner to divert the vessel to Italy where the cargo was off-loaded, the 
case is largely credited with having brought Libya’s nuclear program to a 
halt.20  Other cases, where actual boardings were conducted, have yielded 
similar results.21 
It is worth noting that, if the BBC China situation of 2003 were to occur 
today, we would have an additional legal tool at our disposal.  In particular, 
we have an agreement with the country that, at the time, was the flag state 
(i.e., state of registry) of the BBC China: Antigua and Barbuda.22  Under that 
agreement, Antigua and Barbuda agreed to a reciprocal process for granting 
flag state consent for boarding each other’s vessels within a very short period 
of time.23  The United States has concluded eleven such agreements that 
establish expedited procedures for obtaining flag state consent; together, 
these agreements include the flag states that are responsible for the majority 
of the world’s shipping tonnage.24  
                                                                                                                   
 19 Christopher Clary, A. Q. Khan’s Nuclear Hubris, 8 GLOBAL DIALOGUE, no. 1/2, 2006 at 
130, 130. 
 20 See Christopher A. Ford, The Nonproliferation Bestiary: A Typology and Analysis of 
Nonproliferation Regimes, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 937, 990 (2007). 
 21 In November 2001, Pentagon officials announced that U.S. forces would stop and board 
cargo ships suspected of helping Al Qaeda leaders flee from Afghanistan.  In July 2002, an 
operation involving four NATO member states, not including the United States, intercepted a 
ship in the Gulf of Oman that was transporting four suspected Al Qaeda terrorists.  This was 
achieved by the ongoing NATO naval operation “Active Endeavour.”  Operation Active 
Endeavour, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 
2011).  Other examples include the Israeli seizure of the ship Karine A; the Spanish boarding 
of the So San cargo vessel; and the diversion of the BBC China to an Italian port.  James 
Bennett, Seized Arms Would Have Vastly Extended Arafat Arsenal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/12/world/seized-arms-would-have-vastly-extended-a 
rafat-arsenal.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; Craig H. Allen, The Limits of Intelligence in 
Maritime Counterproliferation Operations, 60 NAVAL WAR C. REV., no. 1, 2007 at 35, 42–43. 
 22 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Antigua and Barbuda Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea, U.S.-
Ant. & Barb., Apr. 26, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14718 
2.pdf. 
 23 Id. art. 4(3). 
 24 The United States has concluded such agreements with various states, including Antigua 
and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, 
Panama, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  Ship Boarding Agreements, U.S. DEP’T STATE, 
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II.  DOMINANT PRINCIPLES IN COUNTERING WMD & LEGAL LINKAGES 
When discussing high seas interdiction, it is best to begin with an 
understanding of two very important international law principles: state 
sovereignty and the non-interference of vessels in international waters.  
These two principles find their bases, respectively, in the United Nations 
Charter (UN Charter) and in customary and treaty-based international law, 
making them key to any regime under which states’ actions are to be 
respected as compliant with international law.   
Although the UN Charter is sometimes thought to have limited the 
dominance of states, it is also true that the Charter respects state 
sovereignty,25 provides for non-interference in a state’s domestic matters,26 
and is premised on working through the sovereign state system to accomplish 
its goals.27  Though perhaps a simplification, one might say that the United 
Nations and sovereign states have reached equilibrium—forging a 
partnership, or a practical, problem-solving linkage. 
This linkage between the United Nations and sovereign states is 
illustrated time and again in the context of major international instruments 
for non-proliferation.  For example, the effectiveness of many international 
commitments is dependent upon the enforcement of domestic criminal laws 
and domestic import/export laws.28  International commitments that rely on 
domestic enforcement in the field of non-proliferation include: the Chemical 
Weapons Convention;29 the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation;30 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27733.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).  Even back in 2007, when 
such agreements had been concluded with only six of these eleven countries, one expert 
pointed out that these flag state countries “account for more than 60 percent of the world’s 
commercial vessel tonnage.”  CRAIG H. ALLEN, MARITIME COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
OPERATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 53 (2007).  
 25 U.N. Charter pmbl.  
 26 Id. art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII.”). 
 27 Id. pmbl.  
 28 Domestic import/export laws entail inspections, licenses, and duties. 
 29 Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10. 
 30 Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation art. 3, Nov. 1, 2005, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 [hereinafter 
2005 Protocol], available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/81727.htm.  The Protocol was 
preceded by a 1988 Convention.  Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221.  The 2005 Protocol 
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the Proliferation Security Initiative;31 the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism;32 UNSCR 1540,33 1718,34 1737,35 1747,36 1803,37 1874,38 
and 1929;39 the 1968 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;40 
export control regimes;41 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention.42 
In terms of stopping proliferation, none of these international 
proliferation-related instruments create new enforcement authorities.  All of 
these instruments rely on states parties to apply domestic controls, within 
their respective home countries, enforcing these international legal 
obligations.  Why is this so?  Respect for sovereignty is one reason—these 
agreements are crafted to avoid encroaching on the sovereignty of the 
individual state party.  A second reason relates to the fact that WMD 
proliferation is, in many ways, just a form of illegal trade or black market 
activity.  Regulating trade is something that individual states have the 
capability to accomplish through domestic legislation; this is equally true for 
the illicit trade of WMD-related materials.  Sovereign states are well 
equipped to “give life” to international proliferation-related agreements by 
strengthening their domestic laws.  Indeed, these international instruments do 
not purport to substitute for domestic responsibility to establish new 
enforcement authorities—a key point.  Most international laws are premised 
on sovereign states using their own domestic laws to “make good” on their 
                                                                                                                   
modified the 1988 Convention by requiring states parties to criminalize the transportation of 
WMD and related items.  2005 Protocol, supra, art. 3bis.  The 2005 Protocol also contains a 
provision for an expedited process for obtaining flag state consent.  Id. art. 8bis.    
 31 See Proliferation Security Initiative, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c1039 
0.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (summarizing the purposes and goals of the Proliferation 
Security Initiative). 
 32 See The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.s 
tate.gov/t/isn/c18406.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (providing basic details of the initiative 
and its mission). 
 33 S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 14. 
 34 S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006). 
 35 S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006). 
 36 S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007). 
 37 S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008). 
 38 S.C. Res. 1874, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009).  
 39 S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 2. 
 40 Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 5. 
 41 See Multilateral Export Control Regimes, BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC.: U.S. DEP’T COM., 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/multilateralexportregimes.htm (last visited Dec. 
19, 2011) (listing and describing several export control regimes). 
 42 Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 11. 
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international commitments, and this is no better illustrated than in the non-
proliferation field.  
The second very important principle—one that is applied to travelers of 
the world’s oceans—is the non-interference principle.  The overarching 
theme of non-interference (and its companion principle of freedom of 
navigation) is that vessels at sea are to be left generally undisturbed and 
subject only to the jurisdiction of their respective flag states.  This generally 
means that a patrolling state, or a potential interdicting state, may only board 
a vessel in international waters with the consent of the flag state.  Although 
there are exceptions that will be addressed below, this non-interference 
principle is fundamental to the Law of the Sea, which can be traced back to 
its famous historical advocate, Hugo Grotius, in his 1609 work entitled 
“Mare Liberum,” or “The Freedom of the Seas.”43   
It is also worth noting that high seas trade is important for the security 
and economic well-being of the state.  Thus, the right of nations to navigate 
freely on the high seas supports the concept of state sovereignty—the two 
principles, in fact, reinforce one another. 
III.  MARITIME INTERDICTION ON THE HIGH SEAS: A BALANCE OF 
INTERESTS 
Where does this discussion leave us with regard to maritime interdiction?  
In light of the non-interference principle, how can we justify maritime 
interdiction in our efforts to stop WMD proliferation?44 
The problem is that maritime interdiction is not a favored activity—as 
noted above, it seems at odds with the principles of non-interference, state 
sovereignty, and freedom of navigation—and a significant hurdle must be 
overcome to justify interdiction at sea.   
                                                                                                                   
 43 HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, OR, THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE 
DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 30 (James Brown Scott ed., Ralph Van 
Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1609). 
 44 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 58, para. 1, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter 1982 Law of the Sea Convention], with respect to the 
application of navigational freedoms in the exclusive economic zone (“In the exclusive 
economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant 
provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and 
overflight . . . .”); see also S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 14, paras. 2–3 (deciding that all states 
shall adopt and enforce effective laws to prohibit non-state actors from developing, acquiring, 
or transporting WMD; and shall establish domestic controls to control the proliferation of 
WMD).  S.C. Res. 1540 also calls upon all states to take cooperative action to prevent illicit 
trafficking in accordance with their national legal authorities and consistent with international 
law.  Id. para. 3(c). 
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Certain circumstances clearly permit interdiction of vessels at sea.  For 
example, interdiction is acceptable if one of several situations exists:  
— A flag state consents to a boarding of a vessel.  This is 
called “flag state consent,” and, because this class of 
boarding is entirely consistent with flag states’ exclusive 
jurisdiction over boarded vessels,45 it is the most favored 
method for boarding. 
 
— A master of a vessel (acting on behalf of the owner, not 
the flag state) consents to a boarding of a vessel.  
However, even if such consent is obtained, the patrolling 
State may only inspect what the master permits, and in no 
case may the master allow the patrolling State to seize 
anything from the vessel being inspected (unless some 
other grounds exist—for example, finding a “ticking 
bomb” that may justify the application of self-defense 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter), because only flag 
states have the authority to exercise this aspect of 
jurisdiction over the vessels of their States.46  Thus, a 
master’s consent is associated with a very limited 
authority for a boarding.  Vessels boarded with a master’s 
consent are usually boarded for the purpose of 
information-gathering.  As a routine practice of the U.S. 
Department of Defense, such boardings are usually 
conducted with minimum impact on the master’s tight 
schedule.47   
 
— A patrolling vessel has a reasonable belief that a target 
vessel is engaged in prohibited activities included in 
Article 110 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
                                                                                                                   
 45 See 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 44, art. 92, para. 1 (“Ships shall sail 
under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in 
international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the 
high seas.”). 
 46 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 47 ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS § 3.11.2.5.2 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds.) (Naval War College 
International Law Studies, Vol. 73, 1999) [hereinafter ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT], as updated 
by DEP’T OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 
(Naval Warfare Pub. 1-14M,  2007).  
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Sea, such as the slave trade, piracy, or statelessness.48  
None of these activities are, on their face, relevant to the 
proliferation problem set, but, occasionally, statelessness 
is applicable where proliferators attempt to hide their 
identities, refuse to display their flags, or give confusing 
or contradictory responses to requests for identification.49 
In the scenarios described above, peacetime boardings are permissible 
under international law.  Indeed, boardings on the basis of one of these three 
concepts—flag state consent, master’s consent, and reasonable belief of 
engagement in prohibited activities under the Law of the Sea Convention 
(e.g., slave trade, piracy, or statelessness)—comprise most peacetime 
boardings.      
IV.  HOW THE RULES CAN CHANGE 
Having described the general law of maritime interdiction, let me now 
emphasize that these rules are not set in stone; there are exceptions, although 
most of them exist only in extraordinary circumstances.  These rules could be 
called “game changers”—circumstances that potentially change the rules of 
maritime interdiction.  They are: 
— Armed conflict—the right to visit, search, blockade, etc.50 
 
— Self-defense51—the 1962 Cuban blockade might be an 
example of this.52 
 
— Slowly evolving practice of States—the British boarding 
of suspected slavery ships for 150 years before acceptance 
by the international community demonstrates the impact 
                                                                                                                   
 48 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 44, art. 110. 
 49 The suspect nationality of the So San provided justification for the Spanish Navy to 
board the ship.  Amitai Etzioni, Tomorrow’s Institution Today: The Promise of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, 88 FOREIGN AFF., no. 3, 2009 at 7, 7.  
 50 See ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 47, §§ 7.6–.7. 
 51 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 52 See Myres S. McDougal, Editorial Comment, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-
Defense, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 597, 603 (1963) (noting that the quarantine could be reasonably seen 
as “in accord with traditional general community expectations about the requirements of self-
defense”). 
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of the moral imperative on the development of 
international law.53  
Although these circumstances could exist, for purposes of this discussion, 
let’s assume that they do not.  For example, given the high stakes in the non-
proliferation field, it is unrealistic to wait 150 years for the law to change 
through state practice.  In that light, action through the UN Security Council 
presents the only reasonable means for changing the rules of maritime 
interdiction.  The Security Council is empowered by Article 39 of the UN 
Charter to determine the existence of a threat to international peace and 
security and to impose various measures to restore such peace and security.54 
For maritime interdiction, action by the UN Security Council can take one 
of two basic forms—the first being sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII 
authority to conduct maritime interdiction operations (hereinafter MIO), and 
the second being sanctions that are not supported by MIO.  It is important to 
determine which of these tools is available for dealing with the particular 
problem of proliferation.   
Sanctions expressly supported by Chapter VII MIO authority have been 
clearly present in at least six historical cases: Southern Rhodesia,55 the 
Iraq/Kuwait crisis,56 Haiti,57 Sierra Leone,58 the Balkan Crisis in the Adriatic, 
                                                                                                                   
 53 Beginning in the early nineteenth century, the British Navy boarded ships suspected of 
engaging in the slave trade.  See Louis B. Sohn, Peacetime Use of Force on the High Seas, in 
64 INT'L L. STUD., THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 38, 44–45 (Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., 
1991).  Such boardings were widely condemned, until the 1958 High Seas Convention 
included slavery as a justification to board.  See id. at 55–57.   
 54 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 55 S.C. Res. 217, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965) (imposing a non-
mandatory economic embargo on Southern Rhodesia that applied particularly to arms and oil); 
S.C. Res. 221, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (Apr. 9, 1966) (authorizing maritime interdiction 
when it called “upon the Government of the United Kingdom . . . to prevent, by the use of 
force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil 
destined for Southern Rhodesia”). 
 56 S.C. Res. 661, paras. 3–4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990) (imposing a mandatory 
economic embargo on Iraq).  Kuwait sent a request to the United Nations for international 
assistance to enforce the economic embargo based on the principle of collective self-defense.  
In response, the UN authorized maritime interdiction, calling  
upon those Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait 
which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures 
commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the 
authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime 
shipping, in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to 
ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid 
down in Resolution 661 (1990).  
S.C. Res. 665, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (Aug. 25, 1990). 
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and Libya.59  The resolutions pertaining to the Balkan Crisis in the early 
1990s serve as a good case in point, demonstrating the importance of the 
Security Council’s particular choice of wording.  For example, consider 
these key provisions:  
 
— UNSCR 713:  mandatory arms embargo 
                                                                                                                   
 57 S.C. Res. 841, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993) (imposing mandatory arms 
embargo on Haiti).  The following year, the UN authorized maritime interdiction under 
Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations by calling  
upon Member States cooperating with the legitimate Government of Haiti, 
acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such 
measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary 
under the authority of the Security Council to ensure strict implementation of 
the provisions of the present resolution and earlier relevant resolutions, and in 
particular to halt outward as well as inward maritime shipping as necessary in 
order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and also to ensure 
that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 841 (1993) is kept 
regularly informed.  
S.C. Res. 917, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/917 (May 6, 1994). 
 58 S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997).  S.C. Res. 1132 imposed a 
mandatory arms embargo on Sierra Leone and authorized maritime interdiction when it 
“authorized” the Economic Community of Western African states,  
cooperating with the democratically-elected Government of Sierra Leone, to 
ensure strict implementation of the provisions of this resolution relating to the 
supply of petroleum and petroleum products, and arms and related [material] 
of all types, including, where necessary and in conformity with applicable 
international standards, by halting inward maritime shipping in order to 
inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations.  
Id. para. 8. 
 59 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).  S.C. Resolution 1973 imposed a 
mandatory arms embargo on Libya and authorized maritime interdiction by calling 
upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally or 
through regional organizations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict 
implementation of the arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of 
resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in their territory, including seaports and 
airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides 
reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, 
transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 
1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed 
mercenary personnel, calls upon all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to 
cooperate with such inspections and authorizes Member States to use all 
measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such 
inspections. 
Id. para. 13. 
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6.  [The UN Security Council d]ecides, under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for 
the purposes of establishing peace and stability in 
Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and 
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and 
military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Council 
decides otherwise following consultation between the 
Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia;60 
— UNSCR 787:  maritime interdiction 
12. Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, [the UN Security Council] calls upon 
States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or 
arrangements . . . to halt all inward and outward maritime 
shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and 
destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the 
provisions of resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992);61 
— UNSCR 820:  extension of interdiction operations  
28. [The UN Security Council d]ecides to prohibit all 
commercial maritime traffic from entering the territorial 
sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) except when authorized on a case-by-case 
basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 
(1991) or in case of force majeure.62 
Notice the stepwise, measured approach of the Security Council in 
adopting these resolutions.  The resolutions first imposed only an embargo.  
Subsequent resolutions were adopted, authorizing maritime interdiction 
                                                                                                                   
 60 S.C. Res. 713, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (Sept. 25, 1991); see also S.C. Res. 757, 
para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (May 30, 1992) (establishing a total embargo on imports to 
Yugoslavia by UN member states).  
 61 S.C. Res. 787, para. 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (Nov. 16, 1992). 
 62 S.C. Res. 820, para. 28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (Apr. 17, 1993); see also id. para. 29 
(“[The UN Security Council r]eaffirms the authority of States acting under paragraph 12 of 
resolution 787 (1992) to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as 
may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to enforce the present resolution 
and its other resolutions, including in the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro).”). 
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pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in response to noncompliance 
with the embargo. 
The language cited above (particularly, “to halt all inward and outward 
maritime shipping”) is typical phraseology for an enforceable embargo 
through maritime operations.  Although this language is not the only 
language that could be used, the Security Council has chosen to authorize 
enforcement measures this way in the past.  The language is specific, leaving 
little doubt that nonconsensual interdiction is authorized.  Thus, states are not 
limited to flag state or master’s consent as the only possible bases for 
interdiction. 
So, is this the situation that we have with respect to Iran?  Do the UN 
Security Council’s resolutions pertaining to Iranian vessels impose an MIO-
enforceable embargo?  No, they do not.  In fact, among all the Security 
Council resolutions currently pertaining to WMD proliferation, none of them 
contain the enforcement language found in the five previous UNSCR-based 
MIO operations that provided the tools states needed to enforce sanctions 
and embargoes. 
To illustrate, we next examine the key operative paragraphs of UNSCR 
1929 of June 2010—the most forward-leaning of four UNSCRs pertaining to 
Iran.63 
A.  UNSCR 1929 
 These are two key operative provisions of UNSCR 1929, which were 
adopted in response to mounting concerns surrounding transport of 
proliferation-related materials by Iranian vessels: 
15. [The UN Security Council] . . . calls upon all States to 
cooperate in [inspections of vessels on the high seas with 
the consent of the flag state] if there is information that 
provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is 
carrying [prohibited items] . . . ;64  
 
16. [The UN Security Council d]ecides to authorize all States 
to, and that all States shall, seize and dispose 
                                                                                                                   
 63 S.C. Res. 1929 expands the arms embargo to Iran imposed by previous Security Council 
resolutions from WMD-related materials to major conventional weapons.  John R. Crook, 
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 
489, 517–18 (2010).  
 64 S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 2, para. 15. 
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of . . . [prohibited items] . . . that are identified in 
inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 . . . .65  
Although paragraph 15 of UNSCR 1929 fully recognizes that naval ships 
of UN member states may be operating at sea for counter-proliferation 
purposes, this provision does little more than permit what was previously 
recognized in international law: flag state consent boarding.  The resolution 
bears little resemblance to the language from the resolutions pertaining to the 
Balkan Crisis in the Adriatic.66  Unlike the resolutions adopted in response to 
the Balkan Crisis, UNSCR 1929 simply calls upon flag states to cooperate in 
providing flag state consent.   
Thus, from a maritime interdiction standpoint, UNSCR 1929 lacks key 
language that we would like to see, and does not give us much more than 
existed before the resolution was adopted.  This means that, for the most 
part, UNSCR 1929 maritime provisions fall within the mainstream maritime-
interdiction paradigm—i.e., they do not authorize the enforcement of 
sanctions by forceful means. 
However, there is one very promising, yet unresolved, possibility raised 
by the text of UNSCR 1929 that could expand the rules beyond the present 
norms.  Because the boarding envisioned in UNSCR 1929 is based on 
consent, a flag state has the authority to say “no” to a request, or even 
withdraw its consent after the boarding has been initiated.  This would be 
consistent with the general rule discussed above regarding flag states’ 
exclusive jurisdiction over boarded vessels.67  However, what happens if 
prohibited material is found, pursuant to a consensual boarding under 
paragraph 15, but, as a result of that discovery, the flag state subsequently 
withdraws its consent?  What obligation does the boarding party then have 
under paragraph 16?  Must the boarding party leave the vessel because the 
boarding is based on flag state consent that has now been withdrawn, or does 
paragraph 16 raise an independent right, or even an “obligation,” to seize the 
prohibited material?  Given that the Security Council typically uses the term 
“decides” to create a mandatory obligation,68 does this mean paragraph 16 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Id. para. 16. 
 66 See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 67 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 68 Some paragraphs use the word “decides.”  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 2, paras. 
7–13.  “Decides” impliedly invokes Chapter V, Article 25, of the UN Charter; see also 
Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. 
U.N. L. 73, 82 (1998) (“[W]hen the Council intends a provision to be mandatory, the 
resolution contains . . . the word ‘decides.’ ”).  The UN Charter provides: “The Members of 
the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
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creates an obligation for boarding states, even where a flag state has 
withdrawn its consent?  Does it make a difference that UNSCR 1929 was 
adopted under Article 41,69 which does not permit the use of “armed 
force”?70  Does Article 41’s prohibition on armed force preclude the use of 
any force, whatsoever, or only some forms of it?  Does nonconsensual 
seizure constitute armed force, or is it more akin to “police force,” which, 
according to some commentators,71 is not prohibited by Article 41?  These 
are the types of questions that come up in the context of UNSCR 
interpretation, and there is little or no guidance to help us resolve them. 
Although some may characterize UNSCR 1929 as being weak,72 the 
Resolution does in fact add to the law of maritime interdiction, and the 
merits of the following advances should be recognized: 
— Embargo of major arms: UNSCR 1929 expands the 
UNSCR 1747 embargo of conventional arms.73  For 
example, UNSCR 1747 prohibited conventional arms 
shipments exported from Iran; UNSCR 1929 expands this 
                                                                                                                   
accordance with the present Charter.”  U.N. Charter art. 25.  When the Security Council “calls 
upon” States to take certain actions, this is generally viewed as non-mandatory language.  See 
Michael Byers, Note and Comment, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security 
Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 526, 532 (2004) (finding the “calls upon” language to be 
recommendatory).  But see James Fry, Dionysian Disarmament: Security Council WMD 
Coercive Disarmament Measures and Their Legal Implications, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 197, 
229–30 (2008) (noting that commentators seem to be split on whether “calls upon” is 
recommendatory or mandatory and concluding that it is mandatory). 
 69 S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 2, pmbl. 
 70 U.N. Charter art. 41 (“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the 
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions . . . .”). 
 71 See, e.g., Kathryn S. Elliott, Note, The New World Order and the Right of Self-Defense in 
the United Nations Charter, 15 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 55, 68 (1991) (arguing that 
UN article 39 empowers the UN to undertake measures under articles 41 and 42 that include 
police action). 
 72 See Neal Conan, New Round of Iran Sanctions Satisfy Few, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 10, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127743438. 
 73 S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 2, para. 8 (“[The UN Security Council d]ecides that all States 
shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their 
territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag 
vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, 
warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations 
Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as 
determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 
(2006) . . . .”). 
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conventional arms prohibition to conventional arms 
shipments (major conventional arms only) to Iran.   
 
— Travel: UNSCR 1929 expands the applicability of 
UNSCR 1803 by increasing the list of individuals who 
may not travel due to their technical expertise in WMD 
development.74 
— Asset freeze: UNSCR 1929 expands the applicability of 
UNSCR 1737 by including the entities of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Line (IRISL).75  The freeze 
includes “financial or other assets or economic resources 
on their territories”76 raising the question of whether this 
provision is applicable to IRISL vessels that dock at the 
ports of member States; if so, this may have the practical 
effect of barring IRISL vessels from conducting trade. 
 
— Boardings: UNSCR 1929 creates a moral obligation for a 
flag state to permit a boarding.77   
 
— Disposition: UNSCR 1929 specifically permits seizures, 
thus removing the concerns associated with past 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Id. para. 10 (“[The UN Security Council d]ecides that all States shall take the necessary 
measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated 
in Annex C, D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007), Annex I 
of resolution 1803 (2008) and Annexes I and II of this resolution, or by the Security Council 
or the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry 
or transit is for activities directly related to the provision to Iran of items in 
subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) . . . .”). 
 75 Id. para. 19 (“[The UN Security Council d]ecides that the measures specified in 
paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the entities of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as specified in Annex III and to any person 
or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by 
them, including through illicit means, or determined by the Council or the Committee to have 
assisted them in evading the sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution.”).    
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. para. 15 (“[The UN Security Council n]otes that States, consistent with international 
law, in particular the law of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with 
the consent of the flag State, and calls upon all States to cooperate in such inspections if there 
is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the 
supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited . . . for the purpose of ensuring strict 
implementation of those provisions.”). 
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UNSCRs.78  The authority to dispose of prohibited items 
now explicitly applies to in-port inspections79 and 
inspections at sea.80  Previous UNSCRs failed to address 
the subject of disposition adequately, leaving States—
many of which had liability concerns—uncertain of what 
they may do with the items they had seized. 
 
— Bunkering: UNSCR 1929 applies “to Iranian-owned or 
  -contracted vessels, including chartered vessels.”81  If 
applied comprehensively, this restriction could have a 
significant impact on Iranian trade, affecting almost every 
Iranian vessel except for those that can complete their 
voyages without stopping for fuel. 
 
— Claims: UNSCR 1929 provides protection from lawsuits 
that arise from actions taken under the authority of this 
resolution.82 
None of this is earth-shattering, and much of it could have been 
accomplished by sovereign states acting independently, prior to the 
UNSCR’s adoption, but due to their mandatory nature,83 these provisions 
                                                                                                                   
 78 Id. para. 16 (“[The UN Security Council d]ecides to authorize all States to, and that all 
States shall, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or 
transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the 
supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited . . . that are identified in inspections 
pursuant to . . . this resolution . . . and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such 
efforts.”). 
 79 Id. para. 14 (“[The UN Security Council [c]alls upon all States to inspect, in accordance 
with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in 
particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to 
and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has 
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, 
sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited . . . for the purpose of ensuring strict 
implementation of those provisions.”). 
 80 Id. para. 8 (“[A]ll States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to 
Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their 
jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels . . . .”). 
 81 Id. para. 18. 
 82 Id. para. 35. 
 83 Some paragraphs use the word “decides.”  Id. paras. 7–13.  See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of using the word “decides”—making a 
provision mandatory.  
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could have a significant impact on maritime practice if applied 
comprehensively by member states. 
B.  UNSCR 1874 Regarding North Korea—A Significant Development 
Here is a final area in which there is perhaps a very promising 
development.  Although we have not acquired additional boarding authority 
in the service of countering proliferation with respect to Iran, a recent 
UNSCR with respect to North Korea, adopted in June 2009 (UNSCR 1874), 
raises some interesting questions about what other actions the UN Security 
Council may take.84   
This is the significant language of UNSCR 1874: 
12. [The UN Security Council c]alls upon all Member States 
to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on 
the high seas, if they have information that provides 
reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such 
vessels contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export 
of which is prohibited . . . , for the purpose of ensuring 
strict implementation of those provisions;85 
 
13. [The UN Security Council c]alls upon all States to 
cooperate with [the above inspections], and, if the flag 
State does not consent to inspection on the high seas, 
decides that the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed 
to an appropriate and convenient port for the required 
inspection . . . .86 
Here, one finds more forceful—and potentially more effective—language 
with respect to activities on the high seas.  In UNSCR 1874, the Security 
Council preserves the flag state consent regime, but goes one step further.  
Under operative paragraph 13, if the flag state decides not to consent to a 
boarding, it must direct the vessel to an “appropriate and convenient port” 
where the required inspection may be conducted.87  Thus, the flag state has 
                                                                                                                   
 84 For example, S.C. Res. 1874 expands the arms embargo to and from DPRK (imposed by 
UNSCR 1718) from major weapons to all weapons, except imports to DPRK of small arms 
and light weapons.  S.C. Res. 1874, supra note 38, para. 10. 
 85 Id. para. 12. 
 86 Id. para. 13.  
 87 Id. 
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only two options—either permit the high seas inspection, or divert the vessel 
to a port where the inspection may take place. 
Although UNSCR 1874 comes tantalizingly close to giving “teeth” to our 
international maritime interdiction laws, it still falls short of what one could 
call an enforceable, effective maritime inspection regime.  The key decision 
remains with the flag state, and, under the UNSCR, patrolling states do not 
have the authority to board such vessels at sea, without flag state consent.88  
Whether other options or forms of coercion (e.g., forcible countermeasures to 
assist the Security Council in remaining “seized of the matter”)89 may 
develop to “enforce” a flag state’s decision—to either allow a boarding or 
divert to an appropriate port for inspection—is something that only time will 
tell.  In addition, it will be interesting to see if the Security Council will 
decide to present Iranian vessels with a similar choice by enacting an 
analogous resolution with respect to Iran. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Counter-proliferation on the high seas remains quite challenging from a 
legal perspective.  This does not mean that the United States is idly standing 
by as proliferators use the seas to transport WMD-related materials.  In-port 
customs inspections are our major line of defense against proliferation.  Of 
course, a problem remains since proliferating vessels do not usually visit 
ports where inspections are rigorously conducted.  For example, North 
Korean ships often utilize ports in China or Burma, where, despite U.S. 
requests, extensive inspections do not occur.90   
For this reason, our capability to conduct high seas inspections remains a 
priority.  At this point, the vast majority of at-sea inspections occur 
consensually.  In fact, the United States has concluded eleven ship-boarding 
agreements with flag states, whereby those states have agreed in advance to 
cooperate with future requests to board their ships.91  Those eleven 
international agreements are with states that move the majority of the world’s 
shipping tonnage.92  Also, we often conduct boardings with the consent of a 
                                                                                                                   
 88 Id. para. 12. 
 89 Id. para. 34. 
 90 See Rajaram Panda, A China-North Korea-Myanmar “Axis” in the Making?, INST. FOR 
DEF. STUD. & ANALYSES (June 17, 2010), http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/AChinaNorthKor 
eaMyanmarAxisinthemaking_rpanda_170610 (positing a growing economic, military, and 
political relationship between the three countries). 
 91 Ship Boarding Agreements, supra note 24.  
 92 Id.; see also ALLEN, supra note 24, at 53 (noting that the new bilateral agreements 
accounted for a substantial majority of the world’s commercial vessel tonnage).  
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master, although a master’s consent grants less authority to search—and no 
authority to seize—than does a flag state’s consent.  Nevertheless, the 
authority to board a vessel with the granting of a master’s consent plays an 
important role in ocean surveillance and intelligence. 
Except in cases of statelessness, nonconsensual boarding at sea is not a 
practical tool in counter-proliferation at this point.  A stronger UNSCR will 
be required before that can take place, and such a resolution is not currently 
on the horizon.  But the law continues to evolve. 
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